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in Sweden
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for Social History, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The relationship between industrialization and intergenerational mobility has been a topic of
discussion for over forty years. In this article both total mobility and relative mobility chances
are studied in the decades preceding industrialization and the decades during industrialization. A
high-quality data set is used covering the male population of a region in the north of Sweden
during the 19th century. Total intergenerational mobility increased during industrialization until,
at the end of the century, both industrialization and the growth of mobility stagnated. Sectorial
barriers resulted in unequal relative mobility chances before and also during industrialization.
However, sons from self-employed classes were less likely to inherit the class position of their
father after the onset of industrialization. At the same time, mobility between classes differing in
status became less frequent. These results show a decline in the importance of the direct transfer
of resources between generations and may indicate the increasing importance of education.
Ineke Maas, Department of Sociology, Heidelberglaan 1, NL-3584 CS Utrecht, The
Netherlands (e-mail. i.maas@fss.uu.nl)
Ó Scandinavian Sociological Association 2002
1. Introduction
According to the ‘logic-of-industrialism’ school,
industrial societies are characterized by more
equal relative mobility chances and higher total
mobility than pre-industrial societies (Kerr
1960). In industrial societies, production
methods are continuously changing, requiring
employees to change jobs during their lifetime,
and children to have jobs that are different from
those of their parents. Instead of traditional
caste, racial groups, gender, or family status,
education is becoming the principal means of
assigning persons to occupations. Industrial
society thus becomes an ‘open’ society. Forty
years after this  rm statement was made,
however, there are still a number of unresolved
issues – both empirically and theoretically –
surrounding the relationship between indus-
trialization and intergenerational mobility.
Research  ndings do not unequivocally
show higher total mobility rates in countries
after industrialization than before or during
industrialization (cf. van Dijk et al. 1984;
Fukumoto & Grusky 1993; Kaelble 1985; van
Leeuwen & Maas 1996; Makowski 1993; Miles
& Vincent 1991). One reason for this may be
that the relationships between industrialization,
the changing occupational structure and total
mobility are not as sketched by the logic-of-
industrialism thesis. Secondly, it may be the case
that industrial societies are not more open, in
the sense of having more equal relative mobility
chances, than pre-industrial societies. Thirdly,
the inconsistent  ndings may be due to
measurement errors. Total mobility numbers
are vulnerable to sample selectivity problems
and changes in research designs. Though total
mobility numbers are perhaps easier to calcu-
late than relative mobility rates, it is de nitely
more dif cult to attain reliable numbers. We will
 rst elaborate on the relationships between
industrialization, the changing occupational
structure and total mobility, and turn to
changes in openness later.
It seems, in the  rst place, unlikely that
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industrialized societies change as much as
predicted in the logic-of-industrialism thesis.
On the contrary, nowadays, industrialized
societies are often described as very stable,
offering lifetime jobs to most of their employees
(e.g. Mayer 2001). Besides, changes in total
mobility are only to be expected if the occupa-
tional distribution is changing at an increasing
or decreasing speed. Stable pre-industrial and
industrial societies could just as well show
similar levels of total mobility. This is also the
case in societies in which the occupational
structure changes, as long as the pace of change
is more or less regular. Combining these two
arguments, we can predict that total mobility
should indeed increase during the  rst phase of
industrialization. In this period the pace of
change in the occupational structure increases
per de nition. During industrialization there
may be periods of accelerating change. It is,
however, unlikely that an industrial society
changes with the same speed as an industrial-
izing society. At the end of the industrialization
process, therefore, inevitably a period of decreas-
ing speed of change, and therefore lower total
mobility, will come.
For a proper test of this modi ed hypothesis
it is necessary either to observe mobility rates
before, during and after industrialization, or to
have good measurements of the speed of
industrialization. Even then, we may fail to
observe the predicted relationship between a
changing occupational structure and total
mobility, because the changing demand for
certain occupational groups can be solved in
other ways than by intergenerational mobility.
Career mobility, in- and out-migration and
changing class-speci c fertility may disturb the
relationship between pace of industrialization
and total mobility.
A second reason for the inconsistencies in
 ndings on the relationship between industrial-
ization and total mobility may be that industrial
societies do not have more equal relative
mobility chances than pre-industrial societies.
Empirically, consensus has not yet been
reached. There has been a dearth of research
comparing relative mobility patterns (also called
social  uidity) within the pre-industrial and
industrializing phase, or the industrializing and
industrial phase of the same society (there is
more research comparing pre-industrial and
industrial societies at one moment in historical
time – e.g. Ganzeboom et al. (1989) – this is,
however, not the same issue). Studies that
compare social  uidity in one country at
different stages of industrialization reach con-
clusions varying from ‘increasing social  uidity’
(van Leeuwen & Maas 1996; Miles 1999) to ‘no
change in relative mobility’ (Fukumoto &
Grusky 1993; van Leeuwen & Maas 1997)
and ‘some mobility barriers weaken, some get
stronger’ (Van Bavel et al. 1998) to ‘decreasing
social  uidity’ (Guest et al. 1989; de Se`ve &
Bouchard 1994).
There is more research comparing relative
mobility patterns over time in societies that
have passed the stage of early industrialization.
But it is still a debated issue whether the
association between class of origin and class of
destination changes over time (cf. e.g. Erikson &
Goldthorpe 1992 and Ganzeboom et al. 1989).
From these studies it is clear that change – if any
– is slow and research covering a long stretch of
time is needed to make it visible.
The theoretical relationship between
industrialization and relative intergenerational
mobility chances has been described by Treiman
(1970). He gives a number of reasons why
relative intergenerational mobility chances can
be expected to be more equal for members of
different social classes in industrial societies.
The greater demand for highly skilled workers
leads to more selection on the basis of achieved
characteristics, such as education and experi-
ence, and less selection on the basis of ascribed
characteristics. Besides, educational participa-
tion broadens knowledge of alternative occupa-
tional careers and provides individuals with the
social skills necessary to follow these alternative
routes. Through the distribution of mass com-
munication, lifestyle differences between classes
become smaller, aspirations may become more
alike, and there are fewer reasons for discrimi-
nation. Urbanization and a higher rate of
geographical mobility, often accompanying
industrialization, force individuals to make a
career on the basis of their own talent instead of
relying on family.
In an opposing view, however, it is stated
that elites will continue to secure the better
positions in societies for their own children in
industrial societies exactly as they did in pre-
industrial societies (Bourdieu & Passeron
[1977] 1994; Collins 1971). The persistent
association between family background and
educational achievement in many societies
offers support for this view (Shavit & Blossfeld
1993). In combination with the strengthening
of the association between own education and
achieved occupational status – as predicted by
Kerr (1960) and Treiman (1970) alike – relative
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intergenerational mobility chances may stay as
unequal as before.
Finally, it is unclear whether changes in
relative mobility in industrialized or industrial-
izing societies are actually caused by industrial-
ization. Especially in the later phases of
industrialization, other potential determinants
of equal mobility chances – such as democra-
tization, a social-democratic government, and
educational reforms – also change. Only a few
studies relate relative mobility to a measure of
industrialization and these measures are often
highly correlated with other potentially expla-
natory factors.
In this article, we will not be able to resolve
all these issues. Our main aim will be to
compare total and relative rates of intergenera-
tional mobility over a long period of time
including the decades before and the decades
during industrialization. The data are of excel-
lent quality and refer to the total population of a
region in the north of Sweden. They provide
reliable data, not only on relative, but also on
total mobility. The contribution of our analyses
to the other open issues will be discussed at the
end of this article.
2. Research on changing intergenerational
mobility in Sweden
Changes in intergenerational mobility in Swe-
den in the  rst half of the 20th century have
been studied by Carlsson (1969). He compares
cohorts born between 1899–1905, 1908–14
and 1917–23. Occupation of the father is
measured at birth of the son (birth certi cate);
occupation of the son is measured in the census
of 1950. Carlsson  nds no indication at all that
total mobility changed during this period and
relates this  nding to a number of changes in
Swedish society. The  rst half of the 20th
century was a period of industrialization and
changing occupational structure in Sweden.
However, this was a steady process, without
acceleration, and therefore not re ected in
increasing mobility. Other changes in Swedish
society, such as the domination of politics by the
Social Democratic Party since 1932 and educa-
tional reforms, may have come too late to affect
the educational and occupational careers of
these birth cohorts. Yet other changes work in
opposite directions, such as the raising of the
standard of living for the underprivileged
groups (favouring mobility) and the levelling-
off of differences in fertility (opposing mobility).
Carlsson (1969:109) concludes, however, that
‘our tentative conclusion, that the rate of
mobility has not changed, no doubt would be
false if the points of time compared were, say
1940 and 1840’.
Studies comparing 1940 and 1840 Swedish
intergenerational mobility patterns do not exist
yet. Instead, Carlsson’s data have been compared
with mobility studies from the second half of the
20th century (Erikson 1983). Using the Level of
Living Surveys of 1968and 1974, Erikson points
to increased intergenerational mobility among
younger cohorts. He interprets this increase as a
consequence of industrialization, rather than of
social democratic government. Effects of social
democratic government should bemost visible in
the youngest cohorts. But it is precisely in these
cohorts that the increase in total mobility
stabilizes. Erikson also analyses relative social
mobility chances (social  uidity) using a log-
linear level model. Although the pattern of social
 uidity hasnot changedover time, the amount of
 uidity has. There has been a decrease in the
relative rate of mobility for the cohorts born
before 1920 and an increase for the cohorts born
after that year. Because the increase occurred at
a faster pace in recent years, Erikson attributes
this change to social democratic policy rather
than to industrialization.
More recently Jonsson and Mills (1993)
compared men’s and women’s relative mobility
chances in the 1970s and 1980s. The trend
towards increasing social  uidity that was
visible in earlier decades (Erikson 1983) seems
to have come to an end in the 1980s. In general,
men’s social  uidity did not change during these
two decades, although the barrier between
manual and non-manual classes became easier
to cross. However, women’s relative mobility
chances became more equal over time.
Though comparisons of 20th- and 19th-
century mobility rates are lacking, a number of
studies on mobility in Sweden during the 19th
century exist. It is not feasible to do justice here
to the rich historical detail these studies have in
the offering. Some general remarks only are
possible. Most works – and all historical studies
– describe total mobility numbers only. The
focus is often on one social group traced over
time. For example, Martinus (1977) followed a
cohort of 500 Swedish peasants and crofters
from birth at the beginning of the 19th century
up to the age of 50. Lundh (1999) studies the
social background and further career of ser-
vants married between 1740 and 1894. This
study documents both a change in the occupa-
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tional structure during the 19th century and an
accompanying increase of downward and
decrease of upward mobility of servants.
Other studies – starting with that of
Thomas in 1938 – focus on the relation
between geographical and social mobility.
Kronborg and Nilson (1978) published an
article on the city population of Halmstad,
followed over the life-course in the years 1898–
1913. They compared their tables with those of
a few other Swedish studies on career and
intergenerational mobility, the so-called ‘Three
City Project’, with contributions by Eriksson
and AÊ kerman (1974), Norman (1974) and
themselves (1975).
A third topic concerns the consequences of
changes in the organization of large agricul-
tural estates in the middle of Sweden in the
period 1750–1900. Gerger (1984) carried out a
detailed study of a small number of career
mobility patterns. The effect of the organiza-
tional changes on mobility and migration of
rural populations had previously been topic of
study by Eriksson & Rogers (1978). Sundin
(1989) investigated the life-course mobility of
500 men born on the estates of iron foundries in
the North of Sweden in the 1830s.
Notwithstanding the exceptionally good
historical records and the concentration on
one segment of the population, the numbers of
persons under scrutiny in historical studies has
been small to very small. A few hundred persons
under observation stand as a large number in
this context. This has been justi ed by the fact
that ‘very great efforts are required in order to
obtain the data in a historical investigation. For
this reason it has been necessary to limit the
investigation to the analysis of the behaviour of
one birth cohort’ (Martinus 1977:13–14).
Summing up: there is evidence that (1)
there were large changes in the occupational
distribution during industrialization (not sur-
prisingly); (2) during industrialization the
amount of total mobility was relatively con-
stant, although the pattern changed (more
downward and less upward mobility); (3)
during industrialization a decrease in social
 uidity seems to have taken place. The last-
mentioned  nding is in contradiction to the
‘logic-of-industrialism’ thesis and asks for
further research.
3. Industrialization in the Sundsvall region
The Sundsvall region, situated in the North of
Sweden, in the province of Western Bothnia
(Va¨sterbotten), consists of the town of Sundsvall
and its hinterland. During the 19th century
Sundsvall was the administrative centre, a
regional market, and a major export port of
timber. The hinterland consisted of a coastline
and vast stretches of forest, traversed by long
rivers. Many small settlements existed, notably
at the intersections of the rivers. Settlements
were organized in parishes, which might con-
tain up to two dozen villages.
In the beginning of the 19th century, the
inhabitants of these settlements by and large
gained a livelihood from cultivating arable land
in the river valleys and meadows higher up in
the hills. Small, water-powered sawmills were in
existence since the 17th century, as were small
iron foundries, using leftover wood from the
sawmills as fuel. Trees were usually transported
via the waterways to the coast and, in part, cut
there in the many sawmills. The inhabitants of
the villages along the coast had the opportunity
to work in these mills, but most of them lived on
the land or by the sea.
During the 19th century the number of
sawmills increased rapidly (for data on the
amount of wood exported and the number of
sawmills, see Hjulstro¨m et al. (1955:220–221);
Wik (1950:200–209)). The growth was led by
an increasing demand for wood in various
European countries, notably England, and
spurred by the gradual abolition of export duties
in the receiving countries after 1840 (Layton
1984). The appearance of the mills changed as
well. The  rst steam-driven sawmill dates from
1849. As the mills grew in size, a specialization
of the workforce took place. Ostergren
(1990:41–42) sketches the growth of jobs at
the Matfors sawmill and iron works as time
went by and the ensuing functional division of
labour:
For much of the  rst decade of the sawmill’s
existence [since 1793], only a single sawyer lived
on the premises along with his family. He carried
on much of the work by himself, with only
occasional help from day laborers taken on during
the sawing season. ... Around 1803, however, a
combination manager and bookkeeper was hired to
provide some oversight and to keep track of the
sawmill’s affairs. ... The functions of manager and
bookkeeper were soon separated to form two new
posts ... In 1836 two more bookkeepers were added
primarily to accommodate the additional workload
generated by the new iron works. The iron works
also required the importation of skilled smiths. It
eventually came to employ a full range of
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specialized smiths and their apprentices ... all
working under a master smith. Meanwhile expan-
sions in the scale of the sawmilling operation drove
up the size of the labor force, which began to reveal
discernible functional divisions. The millwork
gradually became subdivided into a variety of
specialized tasks. In addition to the sawyers, who
operated the giant saw frames, and the foremen
who oversaw operations, there were men employed
speci cally to sort and lay timbers into the saw
frames, to draw off and stack the bark hinds, planks
and laths as they came off the frames and to sweep
away the sawdust. Outside the mill, additional
manpower was needed to stack  nished planks and
boards in the mill’s lumberyard, to draw saw
timber into the mill and to prepare rafts of  nished
planks and boards for downstream  oating to the
loading docks at Svartvik. Others were engaged in
converting the rough bark hinds to charcoal,
which was burned along with the sawdust to  re
the forges of the iron works. Men performing all of
these tasks were assisted from time to time by
unskilled day laborers, while a bit further a eld
others were employed to deliver charcoal,  oat
timber and  nished lumber on the Ljungan River,
and perform necessary construction, service, and
maintenance work on the grounds of the estate.
The growth of industry affected farm life in
several ways. It supplied an alternative occupa-
tional career for farmers’ sons. Through sub-
division of plots of land the number of farms was
growing, though this growth was dwarfed by
that of the population, increasing by a factor 10
during the 19th century (Alm Sten o 1994;
Layton 1984). But at the same time the average
size of farms dwindled over time (Egerbladh
1989; Gaunitz 1979). The division of the
common land of the villages into private
properties from the 1830s onward probably
accelerated this process. The decrease in farm
size was in all probability not compensated for
by a concomitant rise in productivity. Thus it
implied impoverishment and the need for
additional sources of income. It was for this
reason, so it may be assumed, that the industrial
estates with their high-level wages became
attractive (Ostergren 1990; Scho¨n 1972).
However, the change from farmer to
industrial worker was not always voluntary.
Up until the middle of the 19th century most
timber was produced via timber delivery con-
tracts (for this and the following, see Fagerberg
(1973)). A farmer agreed to deliver a certain
amount of wood for an agreed price and had to
see to it that his trees were cut and transported
to the sawmill. After the middle of the century,
more and more wood was obtained via cutting
contracts and these became dominant after
1870. A cutting contract gave the buyer the
right, for a period of, as a rule, 50 years, to cut
trees over a certain height. In addition, they
almost always granted the buyer the right to
transport the wood over land to the river and
 oat it further to the mill. In the last quarter of
the century, timber companies began to buy
large plots of forest land from the farmers
(Gaunitz 1964). This meant that the farms to
which the forestland belonged had to be bought
as well. As a consequence substantial numbers
of farmers were bought out of business.
The iron foundries may have formed a
bridge between proto-industry and modern
industry. Some people owned both sawmills
and iron foundries and workers migrated from
the iron foundries to the sawmills (Sundin
1989; Sundin & Tedebrand 1981). Sundin
(1989:288) describes the blacksmiths of the
iron foundries:
. . . people who had been brought up in this proto
industrial and paternalistic milieu seem to have
managed the transition to a more modern indus-
trial system relatively easily. Their particular
culture, partly urbanized, partly industrialized,
but still with many roots in old handicrafts and
in agrarian society, formed an important link
between preindustrial and industrial Sweden.
Some of the traits of modern industry in Sweden
were not innovations, but can be traced back to the
small iron foundries.
A periodization of the 19th century according to
industrialization would start with a more or less
pre-industrial period (up to the middle of the
century), via a period of early industrialization
in the 1850s, to that of full growth in the 1860s
and 1870s and stagnation in the later decades.
4. The data
Data on intergenerational mobility in the
Sundsvall region during the 19th century
have been extracted from the computerized
 les of the UmeaÊ Demographic Database
(DDB). These are based on Sweden’s exception-
ally rich historical sources. Not only are there
registers of baptisms, burials and marriages – as
is standard in Europe – but also registers of
migration, and, most importantly, the husfo¨r-
horsla¨nger. These are a remarkable blend of
catechetical lists – as noted by a Lutheran priest
– and a population register – as noted by the
same person in his function as civil servant.
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They cover all major demographic and quite a
few major social aspects of the life of all
inhabitants of towns and villages during the
whole year. The lists contain information on
date and place of birth, of marriage, and of
death, cause of death, migration movements,
household composition, civil status, occupation,
vaccination, penance, communion, con rma-
tion and catechetical assessments, on reading
ability, on understanding the Heidelberg cate-
chism and the ability to memorize parts of it (for
a discussion of these sources, see Jeub (1993);
Ka¨lvemark (1979); Willigan & Lynch (1982)
(with a photograph of two pages from a
register); and Bra¨ndstro¨m et al. (1994)).
From the sources were selected all men
who lived in the region, had reached the age of
27, and whose father was also present in the
registration (N = 11,464). For many men, more
than one occupation was registered. We use the
occupation that was registered closest in time to
the year a person (father or son) became 27
years old. Age 27 was chosen because this was
the median age of marriage in the region. The
results of our analyses can therefore be com-
pared more readily with those of others using
marriage registers. Another advantage of
measuring occupations at this age is that the
information on occupations in the sources is
richest around the age of marriage. In the case
of the sons, 93.1 per cent of the occupations
were recorded between the ages of 22 and 32; in
the case of the fathers, this was 76.2 per cent.
For 953 men (8.3 per cent) either their own, or
their father’s occupation was missing. Unlike
many studies making use of marriage records of
bridegrooms only and therefore studying the
occupation of the groom say at age 25 and that
of his father at age 50, this study (1) contrasts
the generations at approximately the same
phase in the life cycle, and (2) includes
unmarried sons. An important drawback of
the data is that mobility data are only available
if both generations lived in the Sundsvall region.
From 1850 onward there was considerable
inmigration into the industrialized regions of
Sundsvall (Alm Sten o 1994). Outmigration
was not as extensive as inmigration, except in
the last decade of the 19th century when
migration to the United States was frequent
(Emigrationsutredningen 1910; Tedebrand
1972). Our research is therefore restricted to
the question of whether during industrialization
the intergenerational mobility chances of the
‘original’ population of Sundsvall changed,
bearing in mind that they had to compete
with inmigrants and that some others had left
the region to try their luck elsewhere.
The DDB sources are not only rich, but also
generally reliable. This is con rmed by com-
parisons with unpublished statistical material,
assembled at the time by local authorities for
purposes of the State (Alm Sten o 1994). One
anxiety does exist in what may seem an
historian’s paradise. Comparisons with lists of
employees of sawmills show that the cateche-
tical registers inadvertently omit a part of the
transitional migrant workers (Cornell 1982;
Ostergren 1990:15, but cf. p. 56:note 1;
Rohndal 1972:chapter 8). Since our analyses
focus on the stable population of Sundsvall, this
under-representation should not bother us.
We will use the class scheme that was
especially developed by the UmeaÊ Demographic
DataBase to describe the region and period
under research. Although this class scheme is
not the same as the frequently used EGP class
scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), it makes
the same basic distinctions: between skilled and
unskilled occupations, white- and blue-collar
workers, employed and self-employed, agricul-
tural and other sectors (cf. Figure 1). Appendix
A presents data on intergenerational mobility of
Swedish men (sons) who turned 27 between
1800 and 1889. Mobility tables are given per
decade, save for the  rst period in order to retain
a fair number of cases.
5. Changes in the occupational structure
and total mobility
As expected, the occupational distribution of the
male labour force in the Sundsvall region
changed during industrialization (Figure 1).
An outstanding development can be seen in
the growth of the group of unskilled workers
after 1850. The growth of the skilled working
class occurred later and was much smaller. The
agricultural groups – farmers, crofters and
farmhands – grew until 1850 and then declined
in relative but hardly in absolute size. Attracting
less attention, but nevertheless worth mention-
ing, is the gradual relative growth of white-
collar occupations, although still small in
number in 1885.
What consequences did these changes have
for total intergenerational mobility? During the
whole of the 19th century, the population was
growing naturally at a rate of about 10 to 15
per cent every 10 years (Alm Sten o 1994).
This development is mirrored in the slow
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growth of almost all classes between 1815 and
1850. After 1850, however, the growth of the
largest class – that of farm workers and crofters
– stagnated. Under the assumption that class-
speci c fertility did not change much over time,
as a consequence sons of farm workers either
had to  nd an occupation in another class –
most likely in the growing unskilled working
class – or they had to migrate out of the region.1
At the same time – between 1850 and 1890 –
there was a migration surplus in the Sundsvall
region (Alm Sten o 1994). Most immigrants
entered the unskilled working class:
. . . crofters, sons of farmers, and landless laborers
came by thousands from Western and Northern
Sweden and even from Ostrobothnia in Finland to
 nd work in the saw mills and timber yards of the
Sundsvall district. (Tedebrand 1986:86)
Thus, the growth of the unskilled working class
was probably attributable partly to the mobility
of sons from the original Sundsvall population
out of the class of farm workers and partly to
immigration. The driving force behind the
increased total mobility of the stable population,
however, was the stagnation of the growth of
the farming class in combination with continu-
ing population growth, as opposed to the large
increase in the unskilled working class. We now
turn to actual mobility patterns, to see whether
this is true.
In Table 1 we present the number of men
changing classes as a percentage of the total
number. Intergenerational mobility was sub-
stantial even in the pre-industrial period. In the
period 1800–29, 43 per cent of men aged 27
were in a different occupational class from that
of their father at the same age. Most frequent
moves were inside the agricultural sector: sons
of farmers (still) being farm workers at age 27
(40 per cent of all mobility). In addition, many
sons of skilled workers moved into the class of
farm workers (15 per cent of all mobility). A
comparison of the  rst three decades with the
fourth and  fth decades shows that as early as
during the pre-industrial period total mobility
had increased. Sons of farm workers, in
particular, were more likely to become farmers
themselves.
In the second half of the century, parallel to
the industrialization process, mobility gradually
developed further, from 49 to 64 per cent in the
period 1870–79. When industrialization stag-
nated at the end of the century, the growth in
mobility did so too. As expected, total mobility
increased most for the sons of farm workers. They
weremuchmore likely to seek a career other than
that of their father at the end of the century than
at the beginning. All three classes that grew in
size show decreasing mobility out of these classes.
This is especially true for unskilled workers. In the
beginning of the 19th century only every  fth son
of an unskilled worker became an unskilled
worker himself. At the end of the century this
number had risen to over 75 per cent. But also
sons from the skilled working class and the lower
white-collar class tended more often to follow in
their fathers’ footsteps at the end of the century
than at the beginning.
Two ndings are unexpected. Sons of small-
scale entrepreneurs showed considerably more
Table 1. Total intergenerational mobility by period and class (per cent).
Outflow mobility per classb
Period Total mobilitya I II III IV V VI VII
1800–29 43 69 40 92 37 78 81 22
1830–39 49 67 61 80 43 74 79 38
1840–49 49 71 70 82 46 71 63 36
1850–59 56 68 82 97 55 74 66 47
1860–69 58 71 75 88 47 80 45 60
1870–79 64 71 87 83 56 86 37 69
1880–89 60 62 89 74 48 83 24 78
I: Large entrepreneurs and higher white collar; II: small businessmen and merchants, master artisans; III: Lower
white collar; IV: farmers; V: skilled workers; VI: unskilled workers; VII: crofters and farm workers.
a Total mobility is the number of men changing classes as a percentage of the total number of men.
b Outflow mobility per class is the number of men in a certain class of origin changing classes as a percentage
of the total number of men in that class.
Source: Tables in the appendix.
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mobility at the end of the century than at the
beginning, although their class was growing over
time. And perhaps more importantly, total mo-
bility continued to grow during industrialization,
although the pace of change in the occupational
structure, fertility and migration were relatively
constant during these decades. This indicates that
other factors also caused increasing movement
between classes. One of these factors may have
been increasing social  uidity.
6. Social fluidity
To analyse changes in relative mobility patterns
we used a topological or level model based on
the ‘model of core  uidity’ as described by
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992:121–131).
Although this model has been developed in
order to analyse class mobility in modern
industrialized countries, the basic distinctions
made – immobility versus mobility, mobility at
the same status level versus at different levels,
and mobility within the same sector versus
between different sectors – are also relevant for
pre-industrial countries. The  rst idea behind
the model is that mobility is less likely between
occupational classes at different hierarchical
levels. We de ned three hierarchical levels
(Table 2). The  rst level consists of large-scale
entrepreneurs and higher white-collar workers
(I), the second of small-scale businessmen,
merchants, and master artisans (II), lower
white-collar workers (III), farmers (IV), and
skilled workers (V), and at the third level,
unskilled workers (VI), and crofters and farm
workers (VII) are combined. The  rst hierarchy
parameter demonstrates that if sons leave their
class of origin, they tend to move to a class of
similar status in society. The second hierarchy
parameter describes the additional dif culty of
moving over a long status distance. If these
parameters are negative, they indicate that
hierarchical barriers existed.
Secondly, the high probability of immobility
is modelled. All classes are expected to show
some tendency towards immobility, but es-
pecially the self-employed in classes I and II,
and the farmers. The  rst inheritance parameter
models the general tendency to stay within
one’s own social class. With the help of a second
inheritance parameter, it is investigated
whether this tendency is especially strong for
the self-employed classes (entrepreneurs, self-
employed, and farmers), and a third parameter
indicates whether farmers are even more likely
to inherit the class position of their fathers than
the other self-employed. Positive parameter
estimates support the existence of a tendency
to immobility. The strength of this tendency for
farmers is indicated by the combination of all
inheritance parameters; that for the other self-
employed classes by a combination of inheri-
tance parameters 1 and 2; and that for the other
classes by inheritance parameter 1 only.
Finally, mobility into and out of the
agricultural sector is expected to be less likely
than mobility within sectors. Negative par-
ameter estimates indicate that it is dif cult to
cross sectorial borders. The model of core
 uidity also contains ‘af nity’ parameters,
modelling more or less mobility between certain
pairs of classes. However, since these af nity
patterns seem less basic than the three dimen-
sions of mobility described earlier, we will not
include them here.
The lower half of Table 2 shows that all
parameters signi cantly attribute to the  t of the
model. Mobility between occupational classes at
different hierarchical levels is dif cult. This is
especially true for classes that are far apart. Sons
of large-scale entrepreneurs and higher white
collar-workers are much more unlikely to
become unskilled workers, crofters or farm
workers than to end up in one of the other
classes, and vice versa. There is also a strong
sector effect, indicating that movements into and
out of the agricultural sector are less likely than
movements within or outside this sector. If
hierarchical and sectorial effects are taken into
account, there is only a weak tendency for sons
of all classes to stay in the class of their father.
Much stronger immobility exists, however, for
the self-employed in classes I and II, and to a
smaller extent for the farmers in class IV.
The main question of this article, however,
is whether the barriers to intergenerational
mobility have become weaker over time. We
therefore  rst estimated a set of models in which
for each time period one parameter is allowed to
differ between all periods (Models 8 to 13).
Models 10, 11 and 12  t better thanModels 8, 9
and 13 (Table 3). This indicates that if change
occurred, it most likely occurred on the strength
of inheritance. This  nding is con rmed by the
signi cance of the change parameters of Model
14. In the multivariate Model 14, which
considers all possible changes simultaneously,
only the Inheritance 2 and Inheritance 3
parameters change signi cantly over time,
indicating that especially immobility of the
self-employed classes and farmers changed.
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Sons of the self-employed classes (classes I, II
and IV) became increasingly likely to leave their
father’s class (the positive Inheritance-2 par-
ameter becomes smaller over time – in the
period 1880–89 it decreased from 2.77 to 0.94
(2.77–1.83)). The signi cant Inheritance-3
parameter at the end of the century indicates
that farmers, who used to be less likely to follow
in their father’s footsteps than other self-
employed, have become more like these others.
Another important  nding of Model 14 is that
no change in the barriers to mobility is visible
before the onset of industrialization.
According to the likelihood ratio test Model
14  ts the data better than Model 7, which
allows no change. The alternative  t measure
(BIC) – which is more conservative and might be
more applicable because of the large number of
cases – shows that Model 14 offers far too many
degrees of freedom. We therefore continued to
investigate more parsimonious models of
change. First, we investigated whether relative
mobility differed between the pre-industrial and
industrializing period only. Secondly, we inves-
tigated whether all, or only some barriers to
mobility changed.
In Model 15 all barriers to mobility are
presumed to be different before and after
industrialization. According to the BIC, this
model clearly  ts the data better than Model 14.
The parameter estimates at the bottom of Table
3, however, show that not all changes are in the
predicted direction of increasing openness. The
hierarchical barriers to mobility became stron-
ger over time (indicated by negative change
parameters). In the pre-industrial period, mo-
Table 2. Topological models.
Structure
Class Hierarchy Inheritance Sector
I Large entrepreneurs and higher white collar 1 2 1
II Small businessmen and merchants, master artisans 2 2 1
III Lower white collar 2 1 1
IV Farmers 2 3 2
V Skilled workers 2 1 1
VI Unskilled workers 3 1 1
VII Crofters and farm workers 3 1 2
Parameters
Hierarchy 1: one step mobility: between levels 1 and 2, or between levels 2 and 3
Hierarchy 2: two step mobility: between levels 1 and 3
Inheritance 1: immobility of all classes
Inheritance 2: extra immobility of the self-employed (class 1, 2 and 4)
Inheritance 3: even more immobility of farmers (class 4)
Sector: mobility from one sector to another
Fit L2 df BIC
1 Model of independence 4,006 252 1,719
2 Model 1 ‡ hierarchy 1 3,143 251 865
3 Model 2 ‡ hierarchy 2 2,992 250 724
4 Model 3 ‡ inheritance 1 1,603 249 –656
5 Model 4 ‡ inheritance 2 1,182 248 –1,068
6 Model 5 ‡ inheritance 3 1,145 247 –1,096
7 Model 6 ‡ sector 772 246 –1,460
Parameter estimates of model 7
est. s.e.
Hierarchy 1 –0.20 0.03
Hierarchy 2 –1.64 0.19
Inheritance 1 0.11 0.05
Inheritance 2 2.13 0.13
Inheritance 3 –0.80 0.13
Sector –0.63 0.03
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bility between social classes that differed mod-
erately with respect to status was just as likely as
mobility between social classes at the same
status level. After the onset of industrialization,
however, short distance status barriers
appeared and long distance status barriers
became stronger. The results with respect to
changes in immobility and in sectorial barriers
are the same in this model and in Model 14.
Model 16 is even more parsimonious than
Model 15. Since there are no indications that
the sectorial barrier and the general tendency to
inheritance changed over time, these barriers
are assumed to be constant in Model 16. The
conclusions with respect to changes in mobility
patterns over time are similar to those on the
basis of Model 15, with the exception that the
strengthening of short-distance status barriers
is not visible in Model 16.
In summary, of the three barriers to
mobility – hierarchical barriers, the tendency
to inheritance, and the sectorial barrier – only
the sectorial barrier did not change when the
Sundsvall region moved from a pre-industrial to
an industrializing society. After 1850 it was just
as dif cult to cross the border between the
agricultural and non-agricultural sector as it
had been before 1850. Relative chances of
mobility became to some extent more equal
because sons from the self-employed classes
were more likely to leave the class of their father.
This change was smaller for farmer’s sons than
for the sons of the other self-employed. At the
same time, though, it became more dif cult for
sons to move to classes that differed in status
from their class of origin.
7. Conclusion
In this article we started with a list of unresolved
issues around the relationship between indus-
trialization and intergenerational mobility. To
what extent have our analyses shed new light
on this relationship?
In the  rst place, we add further evidence
that total intergenerational mobility was higher
during industrialization than before. It is even
visible in our data that the amount of total
mobility stopped increasing at the same time as
industrial development began to stagnate. We
think these  ndings are more reliable than most
of the earlier  ndings on changes in total
mobility. All the data derive from one source
and include both married and unmarried men.
The loss of data owing to unknown occupation
of either the father or the son is very small, even
compared with modern data sets. Finally, the
occupations of father and son are measured at
more or less the same age. In this way there is
less confusion over intergenerational and intra-
generational mobility than when the occupa-
tion of the father is measured at the same
historical point in time as that of the son (but
therefore at an older age). The only drawback to
our data is that they refer to the stable
population, i.e. both father and son lived in
the region, of only one Swedish region. Com-
pared with most historical studies, however, the
region, period of time, and the number of cases
in our study are large.
We also tried to relate the changes in total
mobility to the pace of industrialization com-
bined with our knowledge of natural population
growth and immigration. Total mobility was
expected to increase after the onset of indus-
trialization in 1850. It did indeed, but contrary
to what we expected on the basis of changes in
the occupational structure alone, it continued
to increase in the decades thereafter. Further-
more, mobility of the small self-employed
increased more than was expected.
Part of the increase in total mobility may
have been a consequence of the, to some extent,
more equal relative mobility chances during
industrialization than before. To our knowledge,
our study is the  rst to compare relative
mobility chances in more than one pre-indus-
trial period with a series of periods during
industrialization. The results clearly show that
relative mobility chances did not change during
the pre-industrial period. During industrializa-
tion, however, some barriers to equal mobility
chances became weaker and some stronger. The
sons of the self-employed classes, in particular,
became less likely to inherit the occupation of
their father. At the same time, however, it
became more dif cult for sons to obtain a class
position at a different status level than that of
their father. The sectorial barrier to intergenera-
tional mobility stayed upright.
These  ndings are interesting in the light of
the theoretical discussion on changing relative
mobility patterns. They indicate that industrial-
ization did not unequivocally lead to weakening
mobility barriers, but instead to the replace-
ment of certain barriers by others. The direct
transfer of property became less effective (and
less frequent when propertied classes started to
shrink). Instead, higher-status groups were
better able to set themselves apart from children
from a lower-status background and to prevent
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their own children from downward mobility.
Together these  ndings suggest that the hypoth-
eses of Bourdieu and Passeron ([1977] 1994)
and Collins (1971), predicting that elites would
be able to secure their own position by switch-
ing to new mechanisms to favour their own
children above those of others, perform better
than the hypotheses of Kerr et al. (1960) and
Treiman (1970), predicting that changes in
these mechanisms would create better chances
for the sons of a lower social background.
Probably, the hierarchical barriers have
much to do with differences in skills and
education. It has often been claimed that
industrialization created the need for a, if not
educated, at least literate workforce. For Den-
mark, it is said that the creation of 350 local
technical schools in the period 1870–1930
made it easier to rise to the ranks of, for
example, engineers (Kristensen 1992). For Fin-
land, it is claimed that the sawmills, led by
engineers, in the 19th and early 20th centuries
were the centre of technological innovation
requiring a selection of the workforce on the
basis of educational quali cations (Lilja et al.
1992). A seminal study on industrialization in
Britain from the 18th century onwards reminds
us, however, that the relations between indus-
trialization, education and social mobility may
have been time, sector and country speci c.
Industrialization in 18th century Lancashire is
said to have created an overall less literate
workforce (Sanderson 1972:102). According to
Sanderson, however, this did not apply to all
sectors of the British economy (such as wood
work) and certainly did not characterize the
type of industrialization that occurred later on,
from the second half of the 19th century, in
Britain.
Although the sawmill industry in North
Sweden attracted great numbers of unskilled
workers, there are some indications that in this
country industrialization also went together with
an increasing recognition of the importance of
education. In Sweden, schooling became compul-
sory by law in 1842, but in many places it took
longer before regular schooling was established in
practice. Before 1842 education took place at
home, and the Lutheran priests checked the
knowledge at catechetical meetings. In the saw-
mill industry in the North of Sweden, vocational
training generally took place on the job. The
traditional way was the artisan career of appren-
tice, journeyman and master. In the iron foun-
dries, smiths were also trained on the job (Sundin
1989; Sundin & Tedebrand 1981). At the saw-
mills, workers often started with unskilled tasks
and later on had the opportunity to become a
sawyer or a supervisor in charge of the sawing
process. In the late 19th century the in uence of
the sawmill owners on the educational system
becomes visible. Schools could teach boys and
girls reading and writing, as well as gardening,
handicrafts and domestic science. Changes in
formal schooling in one parish in our region, the
parish of Sko¨n, in the 19th century have been
studied (Johansson 1987). In this parish, garden-
ing (i.e. lessons in cultivation of crops) was not
introduced until the beginning of the 20th
century, and then only in two of the fourteen
schools in the parish. Domestic science (read:
cooking) was taught earlier, after the Sundsvall
strike of 1879, as was handicraft (read: wood-
work), at the special request of the sawmill
owners, who wanted ‘practical’ schooling. It is,
however, important to bear in mind that this
growing importance of education did not lead to
relatively better mobility chances among the
lower classes, but to better opportunities for the
upper classes to secure their privileged positions.
Our data relate to the early stage of
industrialization. This has the advantage that
alternative explanations for changes in relative
mobility, such as educational expansion and
political reforms, are very unlikely to be true. Of
course it would be interesting to extend the
period under investigation to the decades in
which industrialization was fully developed.
This will be possible in the near future with
the availability of the HISCO classi cation of
occupations (van Leeuwen et al. 2002). With
this scheme, historical occupations can be
classi ed in a way that is very similar to the
ISCO classi cation, which is usually used to
classify modern occupations. A comparison
with Carlsson’s data and the Level of Living
Surveys could reveal whether the opposing
trends in the different barriers to mobility
continued with the further progress of indus-
trialization, how great the decrease in openness
was that Erikson (1983) observed in the
beginning of the 20th century compared with
the increase in openness in the earlier decades,
and whether relative mobility chances in the
fully developed industrial society were more
equal than those in the pre-industrial decades.2
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Notes
1 Although the way this is formulated suggests that the
sons of farm workers were ‘forced’ to move, they were just as
likely to have moved voluntarily (because opportunities were
better elsewhere), with the changing opportunity structure as a
consequence. In fact, a combination of the two is likely to have
happened.
2 We are indebted to the Demographic Database in UmeaÊ
and its staff for inviting us to work with their data and for
answering our many queries. We also express our gratitude to
So¨ren Edvinsson who commented on an earlier draft of this
article. Part of the work undertaken for this article was carried
out while the first author was a researcher at the Max Planck
Institute for Human Development in Berlin.
References
Alm Stenflo, G. 1994. Demographic Description of The SkellefteaÊ
and Sundsvall Regions During the 19th century. UmeaÊ :
Demographic Data Base.
Bavel, J. Van, Peeters, H. & Matthijs, K. 1998. Connections
Between Intergenerational and Marital Mobility: A Case
Study: Leuven, 1830–1910. Historical Methods, 31, 122–134.
Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.-C. [1977] 1994. Reproduction in
Education, Society and Culture. London: Sage.
Bra¨ndstro¨m et al., 1994. Lebenserwartung in Schweden 1750–
1850. In A. E. Imhof (ed.), Lebenserwartungen in Deutschland,
Norwegen und Schweden im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, pp. 330–
366. Hamburg: Akademie Verlag.
Carlsson, G. 1969. Social Mobility and Class Structure. Lund:
Gleerup.
Collins, R. 1971. Functional and Conflict Theories of Educa-
tional Stratification. American Sociological Review, 36, 1002–
1019.
Cornell, L. 1982. Sundsvalldistriktets saÊgverkersarbetare 1860–
1890. Arbete, levnadsfo¨rhaÊ llanden, rekrytering. Go¨teborg.
Dijk, H. van, Visser, J. & Wolst, E. 1984. Regional Differences in
Social Mobility Patterns in The Netherlands and Between
1830 and 1940. Journal of Social History, 17, 435–452.
Egerbladh, I. 1989. From Complex to Simple Family House-
holds: Peasant Households in Northern Coastal Sweden
1700–1900. Journal of Family History, 14, 241–264.
Emigrationsutredningen, 1910. Emigrationsutredningen. Bilagen
V. Bygdestatistik. Stockholm.
Erikson, R. 1983. Changes in Social Mobility in Industrial
Nations: the Case of Sweden. Research in Social Stratification
and Mobility, 2, 165–195.
Erikson, R. & Goldthorpe, J. H. 1992. The Constant Flux. A Study
of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Eriksson, I. & Rogers, J. 1978. Rural Labor and Population Change.
Social and Demographic Developments in East-Central Sweden
During The Nineteenth Century. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis
Uppsaliensis.
Eriksson, M. & AÊ kerman, S. 1974. Geografisk ro¨rlighet och social
mobilitet. Resultat fraÊn Trestads-studien. Scandia.
Fagerberg, B. 1973. The Transfer of Peasant Forest to Sawmill
Companies in Northern Sweden. A Case Study from West
Bothia, 1842–1875. Scandinavian Economic History Review,
21, 164–191.
Fukumoto, I. K. & Grusky, D. B. 1993. Social Mobility and Class
Structure in Early Industrial France. In A. Miles & D. Vincent
(eds.), Building European Society: Occupational Change and
Social Mobility in Europe 1840–1940, pp. 40–67. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Ganzeboom, H. B. G., Luijkx, R. & Treiman, D. J. 1989.
Intergenerational Class Mobility in Comparative Perspective.
Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 8, 3–84.
Gaunitz, S. 1964. Forest Resources and Forest Industry in
Northern Sweden 1900–1939. Economy and History, 12, 43–
96.
Gaunitz, S. 1979. Local History as a Means of Understanding
Economic Development. A Study of the Timber Frontier in
Northern Sweden During the Industrialization Period.
Economy and History, 22, 38–62.
Gerger, T. 1984. Patterns of Jobs and Geographic Mobility.
Stockholm: Kulturgeografiska Institutionen Stockholms Uni-
versitet.
Guest, A. M, Landale, N. S. & McCann, J. C. 1989. Intergenera-
tional Occupational Mobility in the Late 19th Century United
States. Social Forces, 68, 351–378.
Hjulstro¨m, F., Arpi, G. & Lo¨vgren, E. 1955. Sundsvalldistriktet
1850–1950. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Bocktryckeri.
Jeub, U. N. 1993. Parish Records. 19th Century Ecclesiastical
Registers. UmeaÊ : Demographic Data Base.
Jonsson, J. O. & Mills, C. 1993. Social Mobility in the 1970s and
1980s: a Study of Men and Women in England and Sweden.
European Sociological Review, 9, 229–247.
Kaelble, H. 1985. Social Mobility in the 19th and 20th Centuries.
Europe and America in Comparative Perspective. Leamington
Spa: Berg Publishers.
Ka¨lvemark, A. S. 1979. The Country That Kept Track of its
Population. In J. Sundin & E. So¨derlund (eds.), Time, Space and
Man. Essays on Microdemography, pp. 221–239. Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell.
Kerr, C., Dunlop, J. T., Harbison, F. H. & Myers, C. A. 1960.
Industrialism and Industrial Man. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Kristensen, P. H. 1992. Strategies Against Structure: Institu-
tions and Economic Organisation in Denmark. In R. C.
Whitley (ed.), European Business Systems. Firms and Markets in
Their National Context, pp. 117–136. London: Sage Publica-
tions.
Kronborg, B. & Nilson, T. 1978. Social Mobility, Migration and
Family Building in Urban Environments. In S. AÊ kerman et al.
(eds.), Chance and Change. Social and Economic Studies in
Historical Demography in the Baltic Area, pp. 227–237.
Odense: Odense University Press.
Layton, I. G. 1984. Urban Growth in Britain and the Sundsvall
District 1850–1920. Effects of Trade Expansion and Indus-
trialization. Historical Geography, 19, 1–15.
Leeuwen, M.H.D. van & Maas, I. 1996. Long term social
mobility: research agenda and a case study (Berlin, 1825–
1957). Continuity and Change, 11, 399–433.
Leeuwen, M. H. D. van & Maas, I. 1997. Social Mobility in a
Dutch Province, Utrecht 1850–1940. Journal of Social History,
30: 619–644.
Leeuwen, M. H. D. van, Maas, I. & Miles, A. 2002. HISCO.
Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations.
Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Lilja, K., Ra¨sa¨nen, K. & Taino, R. 1992. A Dominant Business
Recipe: The Forest Sector in Finland. In R. C. Whitley (ed.),
European Business Systems. Firms andMarkets in Their National
Context, pp. 137–154. London: Sage Publications.
Lundh, C. 1999. The Social Mobility of Servants in Rural
Sweden, 1740–1894. Continuity and Change, 14, 57–89.
Makowski, K. 1993. Social Mobility in Nineteenth-century
Poznan. In A. Miles & D. Vincent (eds.), Building European
Society: Occupational Change and Social Mobility in Europe
1840–1940, pp. 92–115. Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press.
Martinus, S. 1977. Peasant Destinies. The History of 552 Swedes
Born 1810–12. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
Mayer, K. U. 2001. The Paradox of Global Social Change and
National Path Dependencies. Life Course Patterns in
Advanced Societies. In A. Woodward & M. Kohli (eds.),
192 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2002 VOLUME 45
Inclusions and Exclusions in European Societies, pp. 89–110.
New York: Routledge.
Miles, A. 1999. Social Mobility in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Century England. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Miles, A. & Vincent, D. 1991. A Land of ‘Boundless Opportu-
nity’?: Mobility and Stability in Nineteenth Century England.
In S. Dex (ed.), Life and Work History Analysis: Qualitative and
Quantitative Developments, pp. 43–72. London: Routledge.
Norman, H. 1974. Geografisk ro¨rlighet och social mobilitet. TvaÊ
kohortstudier fraÊ n O¨rebro. In FraÊn Bergslagen till Nordamerika.
Studier i migrationsmo¨nster, social ro¨rlighet och demografisk
struktur med utgaÊngspunkt fraÊn O¨rebro la¨n 1851–1915.
Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis.
Ostergren, R. C. 1990. Patterns of Seasonal Industrial Labor
Recruitment in a Nineteenth Century Swedish Parish. The Case of
Mattfors and Tuna, 1846–1873. UmeaÊ : UmeaÊ Universitets
Tryckeri.
Rohndal, B. 1972. Emigration, folkomflyttning och sa¨songarbete i
ett saÊgverkersdistrikt i so¨dra Ha¨lsingland 1865–1910. So¨derala
kommun med sa¨rskild ha¨nsyn till ljasne industrisamha¨lle.
Uppsala: Scandinavian University Books.
Sanderson, M. 1972. Literacy and Social Mobility in the
Industrial Revolution. Past and Present, 56, 75–103.
Scho¨n, L. 1972. Va¨sternorrland in the Middle of the Nineteenth
Century: a Study in the Transition From Small-scale to
Capitalist Production. Economy and History, 15: 83–110.
Se`ve, M. de & Bouchard, G. 1994. Long-term Social Mobility in
Que´bec: The Case of Saguenay/Lac St-Jean 1851–1951. Paper
presented at the meeting of the ISA Research Committee 28
on Social Mobility and Stratification, Bielefeld.
Shavit, Y. & Blossfeld, H.-P. (eds.) 1993. Persistent Inequality:
Changing Educational Attainment in Thirteen Countries.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Sundin, J. 1989. Family Building in Paternalistic Proto-
industries. A Cohort Study from Nineteenth-century Swedish
Iron Foundries. Journal of Family History, 14, 265–289.
Sundin, J. & Tedebrand, L. G. 1981. Swedish Blacksmiths in the
Nineteenth Century. Individual and Collective Life Histories.
In A. Bra¨ndstro¨m & J. Sundin (eds.), Tradition and Transition.
Studies in Micro-demography and Social Change, pp. 161–186.
UmeaÊ : Demographic Data Base.
Tedebrand, L. G. 1972. Va¨sternorrland och Nordamerika 1875–
1913. Utvandring och aÊ terinvandring. Uppsala: University
Press.
Tedebrand, L. G. 1986. Population Pressure, Internal Migration
and the Process of ‘Modernization’ in a Rural Community
(SelaÊ nger) in Northern Sweden. Yearbook of Population
Research in Finland, 85–95.
Thomas, D. S. 1938. Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish
Population Movements 1750–1933. New York.
Treiman, D.J. 1970. Industrialization and Social Stratification.
In E.O. Laumann (ed.), Social Stratification: Research and Theory
for the 1970s, pp. 207–234. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Wik, H. 1950. Norra Sveriges Sagverksindustri. Stockholm:
Kartografiska Institutet.
Willigan, J. D. & Lynch, K. 1982. Sources and Methods of
Historical Demography. New York: Academic Press.
Appendix A
Intergenerational mobility of men in the Sundsvall region 1800–89.
1800–1829 Son
I II III IV V VI VII Total
I 4 4 1 0 2 1 1 13
F II 3 55 5 9 5 6 9 92
A III 1 1 3 16 4 5 7 37
T IV 3 6 8 436 25 5 212 695
H V 3 8 4 8 34 13 82 152
E VI 0 2 0 2 6 8 24 42
R VII 0 0 1 24 19 4 166 214
Total 14 76 22 495 95 42 501 1,245
1830–39
I 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 6
F II 3 18 7 5 5 5 3 46
A III 1 0 4 5 5 0 5 20
T IV 1 3 9 276 20 15 161 485
H V 2 4 4 12 34 16 58 130
E VI 0 1 1 7 4 7 14 34
R VII 0 0 2 41 25 22 146 236
Total 9 27 28 346 94 65 388 957
1840–49
I 4 1 1 0 2 3 3 14
F II 4 12 4 7 4 5 4 40
A III 1 2 6 4 7 5 8 33
T IV 2 2 10 274 29 22 170 509
H V 5 1 5 16 47 19 69 162
E VI 1 0 5 6 13 22 13 60
R VII 0 1 2 60 35 34 238 370
Total 17 19 33 367 137 110 505 1,188
(continued overleaf)
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Appendix A. Continued.
1850–59 Son
I II III IV V VI VII Total
I 7 1 6 1 5 2 0 22
F II 2 8 6 12 4 7 5 44
A III 2 2 1 9 8 5 6 33
T IV 2 3 9 239 23 50 201 527
H V 3 6 4 15 46 42 59 175
E VI 0 1 7 11 15 30 25 89
R VII 1 7 5 95 68 102 320 598
Total 17 28 38 382 169 238 616 1,488
1860–69
I 4 2 6 1 0 1 0 14
F II 1 9 8 7 1 5 5 36
A III 1 1 5 8 8 13 7 43
T IV 2 8 6 257 14 73 120 480
H V 1 10 7 22 43 80 49 212
E VI 1 6 7 8 15 84 31 152
R VII 2 13 5 84 46 153 200 503
Total 12 49 44 387 127 409 412 1,440
1870–79
I 4 1 4 1 3 1 0 14
F II 3 5 4 4 6 15 1 38
A III 3 0 8 5 8 15 7 46
T IV 2 14 14 227 23 128 104 512
H V 3 4 23 17 35 138 33 253
E VI 1 5 9 26 25 174 35 275
R VII 4 14 11 93 41 314 213 690
Total 20 43 73 373 141 785 393 1,828
1880–89
I 13 1 11 1 4 3 1 34
F II 8 6 15 5 8 14 0 56
A III 5 2 15 7 6 22 1 58
T IV 4 15 11 248 6 127 63 474
H V 5 21 15 23 61 197 42 364
E VI 5 12 26 14 37 435 43 572
R VII 1 15 9 124 55 427 176 807
Total 41 72 102 422 177 1,225 326 2,365
I: Large entrepreneurs and higher white collar;
II: Small businessmen and merchants, master artisans;




VII: Crofters and farm workers.
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